As far as theoretical output is concerned, the data can be analysed using the concept of 'face' (Goffman 1963); or in psychological and sociological literature, these differences in 'modes' of interaction could be explained by labelling the Greek-Cypriot culture as 'collectivist' or 'interdependent' and the French culture more 'individualist' or 'independent' (cf. Hofstede 2001; Triandis 2001). However, these categories are too imprecise to account for the differences in the emotions described. As Gladkova showed for the concepts of sympathy as expressed in Russian and English (see below), it is more relevant to discuss the content of Russian emotion terms with reference to Russian social categories such as *svoi/naši, blizkie* vs. *čužie*.

Moreover, Goddard (1997, 184) argues how vague the conventional metalanguage used to describe cultural norms of communication such as *face* or *directness* can be. He explains (1997) how the terms direct or indirect describe different realities when used to describe different languages: Japanese speech patterns contrasted with English ones are described as indirect, and English speech patterns compared to Hebrew ones are described indirect as well. Several earlier critiques (Wierzbicka 1991; Besnier 1994) have also shown that there is not a scale of directness and mere questions of quantity, but there is a quantitative difference: Cultures differ in terms of what things/subjects one should be ¨indirect¨ about; regarding how to be direct; and why to be indirect.

Indeed most words are not culturally neutral; they bring with them certain culture-specific ways of thinking (Wierzbicka 2006). There is only a small zone of culturally neutral words in any language whose meanings are so simple that they are able to be shared among all languages. These words, which are considered *semantic primes,* can be used as "conceptual lingua franca" to help decode and articulate the semantic content of complex culture-specific words. There are a total of 63 empirically established lexical and grammatical universals, which form a conceptual lingua franca that is used to represent meaning of linguistic units. Within the NSM approach emotional terms are explained with reference to a prototypical cognitive scenario that gives rise to a certain way of feeling (Gladkova 2010). This approach is consistent with the view held in cultural psychology, which posits that emotional concepts can be decomposed into "script-like or narrative" slots (Shweder, Haidt, Horton & Joseph 2008, 414) or 'scenarios' (D'Andrade 1990). This decomposition allows researchers to distinguish one emotional term from another, to specify its meaning, and to demonstrate its cultural specificity.

The aim of an NSM-based conceptual analysis of an emotional term is to create a semantic explication of the term that represents a prototypical way of thinking and feeling associated with this emotion. This explication is expected to be broad enough to account for a variety of uses of the term within its single meaning. The validity of an explication can be tested by its substitution into the term's contexts of use. The scripts can range in length from two or three words to literally dozens of interrelated clauses. They are essentially 'texts' composed in a specified subset of ordinary language.

Goddard (2009) draws on linguistic data from and on Malay social values to suggest cultural scripts for the concept of shame in Malay. This involves what other people might say or think about us, but also the ill feelings we could arouse in others because of our actions.

Though they are composed of discrete elements (i.e., words or bound morphemes), semantic explications can be phrased so as to accommodate the subjectivity and

vagueness of many meanings. For example, the following explication shows a semantic description for the word 'lie' (Wierzbicka 1990):

> X lied to Y =
> X said something to Y
> X knew that it was not true
> X said it because X wanted Y to think that it was true
> people think that it is bad if someone does something like this

The final component is often a social evaluation.

As for emotions, they have been the focus of several scholars working within the NSM framework. For the emotional term "happy", a prototypical cognitive scenario can be incorporated into an explication. The feeling experienced by X is not described directly; rather it is described as LIKE the good feeling experienced by a person who thinks certain prototypical thoughts (Wierzbicka 1996, 1999). This approach to emotional semantics allows a great deal of subtle differentiation between closely related emotions, e.g., happy, joyful, pleased, content, related, jubilant, and so on:

> X feels happy =
> X feels something good like people can feel when they think like this:
>   something good happened to me
>   I wanted this to happen
>   I don't want anything else now

As Goddard (2006) explains, speech practices are better understood from a culture's internal perspective and such scripts allow us to explicate the divergences found in the associations with the basic emotions in the Cypriot context and the French context. They allow us to explain what is distinctive about these particular ways of expressing emotions and why the people concerned express things in these particular ways. This metalanguage allows portrayal and comparison of culture-specific attitudes, assumptions and norms. (Wierzbicka 1994, 3).

For instance, Gladkova (2010) identified the precise semantic and conceptual differences between the English words *sympathy*, *compassion*, and *empathy* and the Russian words *sočuvstvie*, *sostradanie*, and *sopereživanie*, which are regarded as their translational counterparts. This example is quite useful for our discussion on the translational equivalents of the French concept word *amour* αγάπη (love) and ερωτάς (romantic love) in Greek. The examples of *sympathy* and *sočuvstvie* will be used to illustrate the theoretical aims.

After quoting different excerpts of English literature and conversational data, Gladkova defines first the cultural scripts of the English *sympathy, compassion* and *empathy*. Thus she defines *sympathy* as an emotion triggered by the realization of a negative emotional state of another person. It can cause some emotional response in a person, yet there is little evidence to suggest that it is associated with a bodily sensation. *Sympathy* can be expressed to another person, but it is restricted to situations when the people are in contact with each other. Since *sympathy* can be experienced in situations when one does not know another person or has no contact with that person, this feature cannot be regarded as an invariant of the meaning. The following proposed formula would capture the meaning of *sympathy*:

> **[A]** *sympathy*
> (a) person X thought about person Y like this:

(b)   something bad happened to this person
(c)   this person feels something bad because of this
(d)   it is not good
(e)   I don't want people to feel bad things like this
(f) when X thought like this X felt something
(g) like people feel when they think like this about someone

The structure of the proposed explication reflects the view that the meaning of an emotion term has a component (components f-g) indicating a feeling which is caused by a particular way of thinking (components a-e). The element 'like' in components (f-g) signals that the explication refers to a prototype of a feeling. Similar structure of explications applies to other terms discussed in this paper.

Explication [A] shows that *sympathy* is caused by thinking that something bad happened to someone else and this event led to that person's negative feelings (components b and c). This situation receives a negative evaluation (d) because the person does not want people to experience such bad feelings (e).

When comparing Russian usages of the word *sočuvstvie* supposed to be the equivalent of *sympathy* Gladkova did not find examples in the English corpus where *sympathy* elicits thanks whereas she found such data for *sočuvstvie*. This indicates that the English word *sympathy* does not entail 'outward expression of the feeling', and thus it differs from the Russian *sočuvstvie*. She then puts forward the following semantic description of the word *sočuvstvie* :

[D] *sočuvstvie*
(a) person X knows that something bad happened to person Y
(b) X knows that Y feels something bad because of this
(c) when X thinks about it, X feels something bad
(d) at the same time X thinks about Y like this:
(e)   I don't want this person to feel bad things like this
(f)   because of this, I want to do something good for this person
(g) when X thinks like this about Y, X feels something good towards Y
(h) X wants Y to know this

Components (a) and (b) in the explication show that *sočuvstvie* develops from the awareness of the bad condition and emotional state of another person. The choice of the prime KNOW rather than THINK (as used for English *sympathy*) is due to the greater degree of 'closeness' between the experiencer and the object: the experiencer knows through his or her contact with the person that something bad has happened to him or her. Component (c) captures the 'painful' sensations associated with *sočuvstvie*. Component (d) indicates that a parallel mental activity develops in the experiencer's mind – the experiencer wants to stop the person from experiencing the negative emotional state (component e) by doing something good for that person (component f). This way of thinking is associated with a positive attitude towards the other person (component g). The desire to express this attitude to the one in trouble is captured in component (h).

Gladkova concludes that the differences between the English concept and the Russian ones are mainly related to the degree of familiarity between the experiencer and the target person and the complexity and the expression of the feelings. Other differences between the meanings of the Russian and English words are associated with the ways the emotions in question are expressed. Among the Russian words, expression was shown to be most significant for *sočuvstvie*. It is less marked in the cases of *sostradanie* and *sopereživanie*, because the former is restricted by ethical norms, and for the latter there is no direct communication between the experiencer and the object.

As well she made the broader conclusion that emotional expression is seen to be less significant in the English words. This fact, again, appears to be related to the prevalence of different models of social interaction in these two cultures. These findings are consistent with Wierzbicka (2009), who reports on a higher degree of emotional expression in Russian culture than in Anglo culture.

Our pilot study data point as well towards a cultural difference in defining the fields of love and fear. Thus our project will help to define precisely what differences are culturally shaping emotions in the languages studied.